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MIGRANT ASSOCIATION AND ACCESS TO PUBLIC RESOURCES: the case of the municipality of Madrid

Héctor Cebolla Boado (UNED)
Ana López Sala (CSIC)

Abstract:

This paper explores the organizational conditionals that explain why immigrant associations in Spain have access to two basic resources required to develop transnational interventions, generally referred to as codevelopment strategies, namely access to public funding in the country of residence and contacts with authorities in countries of origin. Using a small dataset obtained from a pilot study conducted in the municipality of Madrid, we are able to provide a preliminary account for differences across migrant organizations in these two indicators. Spain represents an interesting case study for this analysis because all levels of public administration in this country have systematically used migrant associations as the key actor in defining or implementing integration policies and have cited co-development as an important objective of their policies, linked to immigration control and regulation. Even though our empirical analysis is limited by the small n used (29 cases), our preliminary suggestion is that certain features of an association increase both the percentage of its budget derived from government funding, as well as the likelihood that it has contacts with local, regional or national authorities in the country of origin.

The first section of this paper describes the role that immigrant associations have played in developing immigration policies in Spain and Madrid; after this we briefly review the academic literature on associations developed in Spain; finally we present our data set and empirical analysis.

The role of immigrant associations in Spanish immigration policy

Throughout the past decade, Spain has witnessed an unprecedented growth of its foreign born population. The transformation of Spain from an emigration country to an immigration destination implied a convergence with its Western European neighbors that had attracted foreign workers since the 1960s. The way this story has unfolded is familiar to most EU members: after the acceleration of inflows, a crisis raises unemployment, the arrival of immigrants decreases and family reunification becomes the main reason to enter the country.

What makes Spain a striking case study for scholars interested in migration is the speed at which this transformation took place. The figures shown in Table 1 compare the percentage of foreign born residents in the total population of Spain, the US and Northern, Southern and Central Europe. Over the period 1960-2005 the immigrant population in the major advanced economies increased smoothly and constantly. Southern Europe as a block began this transformation at the end of the 1980s, with Italy leading and Spain following at the end of the 1990s.

Table 1. Evolution of the immigrant population stock.

	Spain	*US*	*North Europe*	*South Europe*	*Central Europe*
1960	0.8	5.2	3.0	1.1	5.2
1965	0.9	4.8	4.3	1.2	6.0
1970	1.1	4.6	4.9	1.4	6.8
1975	0.8	5.3	5.3	1.4	7.4
1980	0.6	6.2	5.8	1.6	8.2
1985	1.1	7.5	6.0	2.0	8.8
1990	1.9	9.1	7.5	2.8	9.1
1995	2.5	10.6	7.9	3.9	11.0
2000	4.0	12.2	8.5	4.4	11.6
2005	11.1	12.9	9.3	7.2	11.9

Source: United National Population Fund.

By 2005, foreign born residents were slightly above 11% in Spain, close to 13% in the US and 12% in Central Europe. In other words, in only five years Spain, a country that had historically been excluded from or lagging behind the European migration regime, closed the gap with the main immigration countries.

The point we develop in this paper should be framed in light of this rapid transformation. We claim that, as in the analysis of other aspects of immigration, the speedy increase of the Spanish migrant stock shapes almost any dependent variable of interest. However, Spain's convergence with its EU neighbors has not ended its historical particularities. As we shall explain, due to its political and economic realities, the country still behaves differently compared to any other relevant comparison term with the exception of Italy and Greece, and probably will continue to do so in the coming years.

Many claim that Italy and Spain are classic examples of the so-called Mediterranean model of immigration (Finotelli, 2007). But this model can be difficult to define because it is referred to within different contexts and for different purposes, including in broad criticisms of lax immigration control in Southern Europe made by scholars and officials in EU immigration countries. However, immigration to Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece does share two relevant features:

The first feature is the problem of overstayers, a situation that has made irregularity a structural problem in these countries and is often pointed to as proof that the Southern model is clearly unsuccessful or at least ambivalent towards irregular immigration when it serves to satisfy economic needs[1].

Another common feature among these countries is that integration has scarcely been mentioned in their immigration policies. In the context of the European obsession with models of integration, these countries have been blamed for lacking an appropriate integration ideology (Koopmans 2010) or for promoting a differential exclusion between the migrant and native populations (Freeman, 2004:961)[2].

The integration question is essential to the objectives of this paper. Over the past several decades Spanish immigration policy has been mostly reactive. The first legal instruments were adopted before the Spanish border felt any pressure. In 1985 a first Organic Law was passed to fulfill requirements imposed by the EU on new members

[1] An in depth analysis of irregularity in Europe which compares the situation in Central and Southern Europe (including 12 EU member states: Austria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, UK) is available from the CLANDESTINO Project. http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/project-results/ For more on the irregular model of immigration in Spain, see Izquierdo, A (2008)

[2] For a reaction to this view from a Spanish perspective see (Bruquetas, Garcés, Moren and Ruiz Vieytez, 2008).

(*Ley Orgánica* 5/1985). For France, Belgium, the Netherlands and other EU members with significant populations from Northern Africa, the EU border with Morocco was of utmost importance. Therefore, after its accession Spain was pressured to adopt the role of inflexible guardian of the EU's Southern border. This is why the first law overemphasized control issues, copying the rigid model of regulation adopted by European immigration countries in the 1970s after the Oil Crisis and the rise of unemployment. Although subsequent regulations rationalized the instruments to control migration to Spain, the recommended equilibrium between integration and control never characterized the Spanish model until fairly recent times. The first law that represented a strong commitment to integration was passed in 2000 (Ley Orgánica 4/2000; see Ruiz de Huidobro, 2000), which granted equal access for both nationals and foreigners (regular and irregular residents) to basic social benefits such as education and healthcare. Further modifications of this basic regulation have respected this generous and strong acceptance of the principle of equality.

The evolution of integration policy in Spain can be summarized in three steps.

(1) Initially integration was not an explicit concern of migration officials.

(2) Towards the end of 1994 another phase in Spanish immigration policy began in which integrating immigrants was actively promoted for the first time. Nevertheless, during this period it is more appropriate to speak of integration procedures rather than integration policy in its strictest sense (López Sala, 2005).
Up to that point, integration had been an area where non-official actors such as trade unions and NGOs deployed innovative but uncoordinated practices (Cachón, 1998; Watts, 2000). In the mid-1990s groups such as trade unions, religious organizations and immigrant associations implemented integration procedures, with resources chiefly provided by the government. Later, local authorities also become involved, particularly municipal and regional governments. Therefore, we may refer to a creative process which shifted integration policy from civil society to government. This "innovative role of the periphery" to use the terminology of Zincone (1999), allows us to conclude that during this period integration in immigration policy was constructed "from the ground up", with the financial support of the state. As several authors have mentioned "this delegation changed the position of these partners, vis-à-vis administrative and political authorities and, to a certain extent, may have altered

their very nature. Many organizations that initially consisted almost exclusively of volunteers now have a significant percentage of contracted personnel in order to provide services subcontracted or promoted by the public administration. In many cases such organizations have become very economically dependent on public administration and this has marked their agenda" (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2008)[3].

(3) In the third stage, the socialist government that came into office in 2004 established a Spanish integration model based on triennial plans, the first of which was presented in 2007 (*Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración* 2007-2010)[4]. The plan adopted all of the EU recommendations in the field (Common basic principles for integration of immigrants in the European Union, adopted the EU Council, 19th November 2004), describing integration as a bidirectional process of mutual adaptation in the context of a basic respect of EU principles. Three basic principles describe this Spanish model of integration: equality and non-discrimination; the recognition of full social, economic, cultural and political citizenship for immigrants; and 'interculturalism' (promoting interaction between people from different origins and cultures, and respecting cultural diversity).

The plan has successfully brought integration to the forefront of public debate on immigration, but it has been less influential in determining specific integration practices. This relative failure can be explained by the complex Spanish model of political decentralization which divides responsibility for immigration policy: immigration control is a competence of the central State administration, while integration policy is in the hands of regional governments and, to a lesser extent, municipalities (De Lucas and Díez Bueso 2006). As a result, almost all subnational administrations have adopted different integration plans.

Although the 2007-2010 Plan may not pass into the political history of Spain as a decisive turning point, the way it was adopted and the recommendations it proposed are essential to understanding the role of immigrant association activities in the

[3] Simultaneously, scholars rapidly began to deploy an academic thinking about best integration practises as possible models to imitate (Aparicio, 2000: Zapata, 2000), although this had a scarce impact in the political agenda.

[4] The second plan 2011-2013 is currently been debated in a wide process of participative deliberation. Prior to 2007, two limited plans of action were approved: 1994 Plan para la Integración Social de los Inmigrantes and 2001 Programa Global de Regulación y Coordinación de Extranjería e Inmigración.

formulation of immigration policies and also to properly understanding the objectives of immigrant associations and how they function. Initially, discussions were organized in a series of workshops with the participation of administrations, trade unions, NGOs and most importantly, immigrant associations and the *Foro para la Integración Social de los Inmigrantes*, a consultative body in which immigrant associations play a very active and key role. A draft plan was then adopted and proposed to these actors for further discussion. Among the objectives of the Plan, participation is of utmost importance (MTAS 2007:314-23). The Plan views immigrant participation as a prerequisite for an intercultural society and concentrates on immigrant associations as the most straightforward and efficient way to achieve this goal. Among its objectives, the Plan:

1. Prioritizes the consolidation of the immigrant association movement and promotes the creation of such organizations, devoting a significant part of the budget to this aim.

2. Commits to provide training to the leaders of these organizations and technical assistance in their projects.

3. Stimulates the creation of networks of migrant and non-migrant associations at the local level.

4. Strengthens the role of consultative bodies in which immigrant associations participate.

In brief: the Plan reinforced a trend that was inherent to the Spanish approach to integration, prioritizing the inclusion of non-official agents in the formulation of integration policies, increasing the role of immigrant associations and the incentives immigrants had to organize themselves in associations that were supposed to have priority access to public funding for the deployment of their interventions.

Regional governments throughout Spain recently developed integration plans inspired by the broad principles presented by the central government plan and the EU recommendations in the field of integration. The municipality of Madrid published its second local plan in 2009 (Second Madrid Plan on Social and Intercultural Coexistence), which also resulted from a broad discussion in which the administration

and the associations interacted in several stages similar to how the national plan was prepared. Its declared objectives may also sound familiar to the reader:

- To guarantee immigrants access to social services,
- provide shelter for new arrivals,
- adapt social services to the needs of the new population,
- implement antidiscrimination measures,
- establish mechanism to learn about the reality of immigration,
- promote policies and experiences of codevelopment with the countries of origin of the immigrants,
- promote citizen participation through associations,
- and consolidate consultative bodies in which immigrants are represented through associations: Madrid forum for Dialogue and Coexistence and the Coexistence boards in each district.

In other words, the Madrid plan, as occurs with almost every other regional and local integration plan, uses immigrant associations as distinguished representatives of stakeholders and promotes immigrant attachment to associations both in an explicit and implicit manner.

Spanish research on immigrant associations

As a general rule, the academic literature on immigration in Spain has developed partly as a consequence of a strong and continuous demand from public administrations that wanted to develop different interventions and sought in academic research certain guidelines to face the challenge of incorporating immigrants. Therefore, most Spanish academic research on immigration is strictly empirical (usually qualitative) and informed by policy oriented considerations, since all levels of public administrations were stimulating applied research to meet their goals. This is especially true of the most recent research on immigrant associationism.

The development of this literature has followed three main axes:

a) Literature interested in accounting for the role of associations in the civic and political integration of migrants in Spain (Martín Pérez, 2004; Morales and González, 2006). The basic conclusions of this literature suggest that the context of incorporation does indeed have an impact (for instance, Barcelona has more successfully promoted immigration participation in associations than Madrid and smaller regional capitals) and that Latin American organizations have more heterogeneous patterns of associationism and objectives than Moroccan organizations.
b) Research on leadership within immigrant associations (Verdugo y Gómez, 2006). Because of the intense participation of associations in the definition of policies and regulations, some scholars have focused on the demands of leaders. Broadly speaking, this literature has identified three types of general demands: cultural and identitary; dependency and the impact of center-periphery relations between emitting and host country, equality of rights between immigrants and natives.
c) Finally, a number of studies have analyzed the incentives immigrants have for participating in associations (Veredas, 2004). Overall, the conclusions of this line of research point out the existence of strong economic incentives (associations help immigrants in the consolidation of their migration project); social capital incentives (associations provide social resources otherwise not easily available to new arrivals); political incentives relating both host society and country of origin.

González and Morales (2009) provide a quantitative description of the dynamics of immigrant associationism in Spain as well as an analysis of how determinant institutional incentives are for understanding the practices of associations and the density of immigrant associationism[5]. The paper includes a census of associations in the cities of Barcelona, Madrid and Murcia conducted between 2004 and 2008. From these censuses we know that "mortality rates" in all three cases are quite high. In Barcelona and Madrid 465 and 417 migrant associations where identified. However,

[5] The paper presents the basic conclusions of two research projects, CapSocInmig and the EU project LocalMultiDem. Both represent the most comprehensive effort to describe and quantify the density of immigrant associations in Madrid, Barcelona and Murcia (south east Spain).

in both cases only 48% of them (223 and 199, respectively) were confirmed to be still active. Of the 74 associations listed in the smaller city of Murcia only 27% could be confirmed as still in existence. The degree of formalization (associations that were registered in local, regional or national registers) was revealed to be somewhat high: 388 in Barcelona, 312 in Madrid and 45 in Murcia. Yet, the difference between the number of associations registered and the whole universe of associations identified in each case, also suggest that many associations remain informal.

The density and characteristics of migrant associations varied greatly across cities. Density is greater in large cities than in small ones: in Madrid there were 0.7 associations per 1000 migrants (0.3 if calculated for those whose continuity was confirmed); Barcelona had 1.6 per 1000 (0.8 if restricted to active associations); and Murcia had 1.4 per 1000 (0.3 active). While in Madrid, associations where more likely to have a national-origin focus, in Barcelona associations generally had more universal aims. The different compositions of these local contexts can explain some of these specificities, as well as the distinctive approach to migrant associations of each local government. With respect to funding, Madrid is the only one offering annual calls for tenders to fund migrant associations, while in all three cases, migrant associations can apply for the same funding sources available to all other associations. While according to the general Spanish practice, migrant associations play an important part in consultative bodies attached to local authorities and collaborate with municipalities in the implementation of local policies, only in Barcelona do they participate in the definition of local migration policies. The regional government of Madrid has also created and funded National houses for the largest migrant.

Data: pilot study and description of associative activism

The data used in the empirical part of this paper comes from a pilot study conducted in the Municipality of Madrid which sampled migrant associations that declare links to their countries of origin and carry out activities in those countries. The pilot study resulted in a sample of 29 migrant associations that were contacted after reviewing official and consular registers from the main countries of origin excluding Romania since EU citizenship alters the logic and status of Romanian migrant organizations and their access to tenders offering public funding.

Table 2. Country of origin of associations.

	N.	*%*
Colombia	13	44.83
Ecuador	3	10.34
Morocco	4	13.79
Dominican Republic	8	27.59
Romania	1	3.45
Total	29	100

Because of the sampling framework, the organizations were more likely to be registered rather than informal (official registers where used to list the organizations to be contacted). All 29 organizations declared that they were legally registered in Spain as NGOs. Given what we know about informality, it is very possible that the pilot has overrepresented organizations with a high degree of formalization. The organizations sampled are very heterogeneous from the point of view of age. If we consider the year of registration we can see that organizations working in the field of codevelopment have an average age of 10 years, although this estimate is derived from a very diverse distribution (see Graph 1) and includes several organizations that were formalized long before the intensification of migration inflows.

Graph 1. Distribution of the year of registration.



Graph 2. Time from creation to registration.



The second graph shows that the most frequent case is one in which the association is formalized at the time of its foundation. In the sample, 80% of the associations were

created because of private motivations. Only 17% exist due to external institutional impulses from the countries of origin.

From the pilot survey we can describe the two most important aims of the associations interviewed (see Graph 3). From the graph it is clear that associations have two souls. In sixteen cases, the associations report that codevelopment is one of their most important areas of intervention. In twelve cases they report social integration in general. All other items could be included under one of these two broad categories, but were specified because the association declares that it has a high degree of specialization.

Graph 3. Summary of the two most important objectives of all organizations.



Twenty three operate in both countries and only 3 in origin. They report rich level of contacts with Spanish public administrations (17 at the national level, 8 at the local one and 4 at the regional level). Table 3 presents a more detailed summary of the sort of interventions deployed by the associations, distinguishing between countries of origin and destination. In both cases education is the most frequently mentioned area of intervention. In countries of origin, health and supporting productive activities follow. In Spain, on the contrary, associations prioritize social assistance and helping

immigrants to deal with the administration in addition to civic and cultural activities for coethnics.

Table 3. Interventions in Spain and country of origin.

Interventions in Spain		*Interventions in country of origin*	
Political activities	2	Gender, youth	2
Religion	3	All	1
Awareness among Spaniards	2	Religion	2
Assistance to productive activities	3	Fight against irregular migration	2
Political activities	3	Codevelopment	3
International Aid	3	Public services provision	4
Fight against violence	4	Construction	5
Fund raising	6	Fund raising	6
Documents	11	Productive activities	8
Social assistance	11	Health	9
Civic and cultural activities	11	Education	14
Education	22		

Empirics

The pilot study did not provide a large sample of organizations to conduct a deep empirical analysis of the associations based in Madrid (29). Despite the limitations imposed by the small n problem, the questionnaire offers a wide range of indicators that permit a preliminary description of how associations attain access to public resources provided by the different levels of Spanish administration, as explained throughout the paper.

Access to public funding can differ depending on the characteristics of the associations. First of all, age can be a strong predictor of funding since, as we know from previous studies, the mortality rate of associations is very large and is negatively associated with age; in other words, more stable associations are also older ones. The specific mechanism we seek to test in this analysis is similar to a principal-agent framework in which the administration should believe that the prospects of the association are good enough to take the risk of providing public funds for its goals.

H1: Older associations should be more likely to get public funds than younger ones.

The existence of strong transnational networks could also be an indicator of the association's potential to develop successful projects in countries of origin. Given that codevelopment is one of the explicit goals of the Spanish and the Madrid integration plans, associations whose networks involve public administrations in their countries of origin should be more likely to gain access to public resources. The questionnaire used in the pilot includes information about the existence of contacts with authorities at the national, regional and local level as well as at the consular level. Splitting this group of variables in two could be a smart alternative to the creation of a single indicator which collapses all of them. Associations having contact with the national government in countries of origin can considered to have greater social capital in origin, and thus, can be more trustworthy than those whose network only includes contacts from lower levels of the administration.

H2: Contacts with the public administration in the countries of origin increase an association's potential to receive funding in Spain

H2.1: The higher the level of the administration with which the association has contact the more likely it is to have access to public funds.

Another resource that an organization may use to get access to government funding is its membership. The size of the membership is important, because larger associations might for obvious reasons be more successful in lobbying for public funds. Furthermore, larger associations are normally selected as distinguished representatives of their co-ethnics in the consultative boards that the central government and the municipality of Madrid maintain to give voice and visibility to the demands of the immigrant population.

H3: the number of members an association has increases its public relevance, making it more likely that it will gain access to government funds.

Considering only the size of an association ignores qualitative aspects of its membership that can be relevant predictors of its success in receiving government funding. Associations differ in the sophistication of its members. The questionnaire includes an indicator which represents the percentage of members with university education. By using this proxy of the quality of the association membership we can

deduce its ability to formulate more sophisticated proposals or to more effectively lobby different public administrations.

H4: The higher the average level of education of the members, the more effective the association will be in receiving government funding.

Gaining public funding may not only be related to the sophistication (average education) of an association's membership, but also to broader resources that can be mobilized for this objective. Three types of indicators have been used in the analyses:

The pilot study provided rich information about the different resources available to associations, including owning or renting a permanent headquarters, computers, fax and a web page. These indicators were collapsed into a single independent variable ranging from 0 to 12 (0 stands for the absence of the resource, 1 for having it on loan, 2 for renting it and 4 for owning it). These resources increase the visibility of associations and ease administrative tasks that are mandatory in fund raising. Nonetheless, material resources are only part of the story.

Human resources are also expected to be important. This should not be confused with membership since members may engage in different tasks as volunteers. The number of employees seems to be a more appropriate proxy for the indicator we want to model. As such, this variable is introduced as an absolute range, so it somewhat captures the size of the association too. The questionnaire allowed us to refine this indicator by calculating the percentage of full time employees working in the association. However, this alternative was discarded because it represented no changes in the conclusions, as explained later .

Finally, the most obvious and straightforward measure of resources is the association budget. This variable is less transparent analytically since it mixes all sorts of resources. Yet it can potentially explain a great deal since larger organizations, as measured by budget, can also have a stronger attraction for public funding as a consequence of path dependency.

H5: Organizations that benefit from more resources (material, human and financial) can be more successful in public fund-raising.

Our dependent variable of interest is the proportion of the association budget that comes from public funds. This variable is useful because it protects our analysis from being endogenous. For instance, if we were to use the amount of resources obtained from government funding, some of our hypotheses could result impossible to test. This is particularly the case of arguments linking organization resources to a larger ability to extract public funds. Furthermore, our dependent variable has the advantage of being a relative measure (a proportion) making it possible to understand the ability of each organization to draw public resources relative to its overall potential. The variable selected for our analysis is reported by the leader of each organization in a rough estimate.

Although we have been able to estimate OLS equations, in this case the small-n problem limits the potential of our analysis. The tables presented below include different models, each of them with a single dependent variable. Our results are stable if models are re-estimated using robust standard errors.

Table 4. OLS. Percentage of budget derived from public funding.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Year of registration	-2.64*							
	(1.18)							
Rel. central gov. origin		40.94*						
		(15.74)						
Rel. country origin			8.75					
			(5.22)					
N. of members				0.00				
				(0.00)				
% university					-1.73			
					(2.80)			
Resources						5.88*		
						(1.16)		
N. employees							1.30*	
							(0.47)	
Budget								13.04*
								(2.55)
Constant	5313.37*	12.22	6.25	35.34*	39.15*	-47.99*	29.41*	-9.82
	2363.36	12.97	21.72	8.55	10.11	18.37	8.21	11.37
N	28	28	24	28	24	28	28	28
F	4.98	6.76*	2.82	0.50	0.38	25.56	7.64	26.09
R2	0.16	0.21	0.11	0.02	0.02	0.50	0.23	0.50

Legend: * p<.05; b/se

The results confirm some of our initial expectations. The ability to gain access to public funds is greater among older organizations (H1) as well as among associations

that have more privileged links to governments in countries of origin (H2). This is deduced from the fact that the parameter reporting the effect of having contact with the national government is significant while the same does not happen in the estimate corresponding to other (regional, local and consular) contacts (H2.1). Older organizations may have more experience regarding procedures and the sort of initiatives of governments in supporting codevelopment and projects in countries of origin. Strong links to governments in countries of origin legitimize and improve their proficiency in the implementation of these projects.

Surprisingly, the size of the organization and the sophistication of its members (average education) are not relevant predictors of our dependent variable (H3 and H4). In other words, the Madrid and statewide public administrations seem to be less demanding than expected in allocating public funds across organizations. Size does not correlate significantly with the proportion of the association's budget that comes from public funds. The same happens with the percentage of members with a university degree. Note that in this particular case the expectations are reversed since the correlation between the dependent and independent variable of interest is negative.

Hypothesis 5 is completely confirmed. Prior resources are the most relevant predictor of the proportion of budget that comes from government funding. It is difficult to offer a precise interpretation of this regularity but the fact that not all links to the country of origin are relevant, and neither are the size of the organization and the quality of its members, can imply that organizations specialize in fund raising and lobbying public administrations at different levels.

The final part of our empirical analysis focuses on a second resource that associations need to establish a transnational agenda: contact with authorities in the country of origin. This new dependent variable includes contacts with central, regional and local authorities as well as consular activities in the country of destination. This is another facet of the strategies employed by associations since public funding and permission to intervene are two essential elements of a proper strategy for codevelopment.

Table 5 presents the results of an OLS regression analysis that contrasts the relevance of some of the known independent variables (hypotheses on the age of the associations, the relations with authorities in the host country –distinguishing between

the central administration and the rest–, the size and educational level of members, and those related to resources).

Table 5. OLS. Access to authorities in the country of origin

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Year registration	-0.10							
	(0.05)							
Rel. with central gov. Spain		1.58*						
		(0.68)						
Rel. other gov. Spain			0.52					
			(0.29)					
N. of members				0.00				
				(0.00)				
% university					0.05			
					(0.10)			
Resources						0.16*		
						(0.06)		
N. employees							0.03	
							(0.02)	
Budget								0.22
								(0.14)
Constant	195.34	2.71*	2.65*	3.74*	3.86*	1.45	3.55*	2.98*
	99.94	0.58	0.72	0.37	0.40	0.99	0.37	0.65
N	23	24	24	23	20	24	24	24
F	3.67	5.34	3.36	1.08	0.20	6.37	2.64	2.33
R2	0.15	0.20	0.13	0.05	0.01	0.22	0.11	0.10

Legend: * p<.05; b/se

Access to authorities in countries of origin seems to be less predictable using our theoretical arguments than an association's ability to gain access to public funding. Only two predictors are statistically significant: the relations with the central administration in Spain, and the resources available to the organization.

Discussion and conclusion

It must be emphasized once again that these are only preliminary conclusions given the methodological limitations of our analysis (specially the small-n problem that limits and shapes our empirical exercise).

Despite these limitations, our analysis indicates that there are certain features in our organizations that are systematically associated with the two main resources analyzed in this paper: access to public funding and contact with authorities in the country of origin. Some of our conclusions are striking. For example, the size of an organization and the quality of its membership, as measured by the percentage of members that hold a university degree, seem to be irrelevant predictors. On the contrary, age, contact with national authorities from the country of origin and organizational resources seem to account for part of the variance in terms of access to government

funding. This finding is in line with the qualitative information that the leaders of our organizations provided interviewers when answering the questionnaire. In fact, this conclusion is also in line with the expectations generated by Spanish integration policies since, as explained earlier, all levels of Spanish administration have tended to prioritize contacts with associations ever since the early definition of integration objectives and strategies.

Organizational features accounting for variance in contacts with authorities in countries of origin are less clear although there are signs that links to the Spanish central government and resources available to the association can be important predictors.

Overall, our conclusions suggest that although the Spanish administrations have been quite open to providing resources to all migrant organizations (large and small), there are some that have benefitted from this institutional support over longer periods of time. That is, a sort of clientelism may exist between longstanding and well-funded migrant organizations and different levels of government.

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